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INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews decisions rendered during 1991 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the sub-
ject of international trade. The Federal Circuit stands at the pinna-
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cle of a specialized system for the rendering and review of trade and
customs decisions. The U.S. Department of Commerce's and the
U.S. International Trade Commission's determinations concerning
antidumping and countervailing duties, the Department of Labor's
determinations concerning adjustment assistance, and the Customs
Service's decisions fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of International Trade (CIT).' Appeal from final decisions of the
CIT, in turn, comes under exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Cir-
cuit.2 The Federal Circuit holds direct exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion over final determinations of the Commission made under 19
U.S.C. § 1337 and ovrer questions of law in certain decisions of
Commerce under a provision of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule.3
The Federal Circuit thus exercises substantial supervisory jurisdic-
tion over the administration of trade laws. This Article examines
the Federal Circuit's performance of that function in the decisions
the court issued in 1991.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Few aspects of an appeals court's resolution of its own jurisdiction
have a more direct impact on agency procedures than its decisions
on the circumstances in which administrative remedies must be ex-
hausted before an appeal may arise. The requirements for the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies can become confused in a
statutory scheme like that governing antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, in which responsibility is divided among several ad-
ministrative agencies. Responsibility for the antidumping law is
divided among three agencies-U.S. Department of Commerce
(Commerce), the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commis-
sion), and the U.S. Customs Service (Customs). The fundamental
framework for their joint responsibility as it currently exists was es-
tablished by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.4 Under the 1979
Act, Commerce, as the administering authority, makes a determina-
tion of whether imported goods are sold or are likely to be sold in
the United States at less than foreign market value.5 If the Commis-
1. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988). No Department of Labor determination was the subject of
a reported Federal Circuit decision in 1991.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988).
3. Id. § 1295(a)(6)-(7).
4. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)-(2) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
If:
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sion determines that those goods are a cause of or threaten material
injury to a domestic industry, Commerce assesses a duty in an
amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value ex-
ceeds the United States price for the merchandise. 6 Customs admits
merchandise subject to these orders with the deposit of estimated
antidumping duties, but does not "liquidate" these entries, i.e.,
charge the final duty rate, until final antidumping duty rates are de-
termined. 7 The estimated duty becomes the final antidumping duty
rate for each year's entries unless Commerce requests a review of
the rate, called a "751 review" because it originated in section 751
of the Trade Act of 1930.8 The result of the 751 review then be-
comes the amount of the duty to be paid under the antidumping
order and establishes the estimated duty deposit rate for the subse-
quent period.9 Both the results of Commerce's reviews and Cus-
toms' liquidation of entries are subject to appeal to the CIT, but for
any matter that is subject to Commerce review, administrative re-
view is a prerequisite for judicial review.' 0
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchan-
dise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded.
Id.
6. See id. § 1673e.
7. See id. §§ 1673d(c), 1673e(a) (discussing implications of antidumping final determi-
nations). Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673g, Customs may not admit imports unless an estimated duty
is deposited in the amount of the antidumping margin calculated by Commerce in the original
antidumping determination.
8. Id. §§ 1673e(a), 1675(a). 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) states:
At least once during each 12-month period beginning on the anniversary of the date
of publication of... an antidumping order under this subtitle ... the administering
authority [Commerce], if a request for such a review has been received.., shall (B)
review, and determine.., the amount of any antidumping duty.., and shall publish
the results of such review, together with notice of any duty to be assessed, estimated
duty to be deposited, or investigation to be resumed in the Federal Register.
Id. § 1675(a).
9. Id. § 1675(a)(2).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1988) (setting forth jurisdiction of Court of International
Trade). Text of the pertinent part of the statute is as follows:
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under sec-
tion 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1988)]....
(c) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)
(1988)].
Id.; see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(B), 1514(a) (1988) (stating that antidumping determinations
are reviewable by CIT if deemed a reviewable determination). 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)
provides as follows:
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In Nichimen America, Inc. v. United States," the Federal Circuit
parsed certain of these issues in order to determine what portions of
appellant's cause of action might survive its failure to request a 751
review from Commerce. 12 Nichimen imported Japanese-manufac-
tured television receivers, allegedly for Montgomery Ward & Co.' 3
Commerce informed Nichimen that its receivers for the period pre-
ceding March 31, 1979 would be assessed specified additional an-
tidumping duties unless Nichimen requested a 751 administrative
review. 14 Nichimen filed no request with Commerce for a 751 re-
view but, after paying the assessed duties, filed a protest with Cus-
(i) Final affirmative determinations by the administering authority and by the
Commission under section 1671d or 1673d of this title, including any negative part
of such a determination (other than a part referred to in clause (ii)).
(ii) A final negative determination by the administering authority or the Commis-
sion under section 1671d or 1673d of this title, including, at the option of the appel-
lant, any part of a final affirmative determination which specifically excludes any
company or product.
(iii) A final determination, other than a determination reviewable under para-
graph (1), by the administering authority or the Commission under section 1675 of
this title.
(iv) A determination by the administering authority, under section 1671c or
1673c of this title, to suspend an antidumping duty or a countervailing duty investi-
gation, including any final determination resulting from a continued investigation
which changes the size of the dumping margin or net subsidy calculated, or the rea-
soning underlying such calculations, at the time the suspension agreement was con-
cluded.
(v) An injurious effect determination by the Commission under section 1671c(h)
or 1673c(h) of this title.
(vi) A determination by the administering authority as to whether a particular
type of merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an ex-
isting finding of dumping or antidumping or countervailing duty order.
19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2)(B) (1988). Additionally, 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) provides that:
[D]ecisions of the appropriate customs officer, including the legality of all orders and
findings entering into the same, as to-
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within thejurisdiction of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for redelivery
to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, except a determi-
nation appealable under section 1337 of this title;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; and
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c) of this title,
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons ... unless a protest is filed in accord-
ance with this section, or unless a civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in
whole or in part, is commenced in the United States Court of International
Trade....
Id. § 1514(a).
11. 938 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
12. Nichimen Am., Inc. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1287-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
13. Id. at 1287.
14. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1988) (delineating Trade Agreements Act of 1979 "Section
751 review"); supra note 5 (describing criteria for deciding that merchandise has been unlaw-
fully dumped in United States).
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toms, claiming that the applicable duties were subject to a
settlement agreement between the United States government and
Montgomery Ward. 15 The CIT dismissed Nichimen's appeal of
Customs' denial of its protest, holding that by failing to file a re-
quest for a 751 review before Commerce, Nichimen failed to ex-
haust its administrative remedies. 16 The Federal Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part, splitting the outcome according to what,
in its view, was appropriate for Commerce to have considered in a
751 review. 17
As to those matters on which the statute explicitly instructs Com-
merce to make determinations in 751 reviews, the Federal Circuit
had no difficulty in finding that Nichimen failed to exhaust its ad-
ministrative remedies.18 For the purpose of Commerce's review, 19
U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) states that Commerce shall determine, inter
alia, the foreign market value and cost of production of the imports
and whether foreign market value exceeds the United States price. 19
15. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1287-88.
16. Nichimen Am., Inc. v. United States, 719 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-10 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1989), aff'd in part and reu'd in part, 938 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1991). An antidumping
determination deemed reviewable under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B) is ripe for CIT action as
provided for in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) as follows:
Within thirty days after-
(i) the date of publication in the Federal Register of-
(I) notice of any determination described in clause (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of sub-
paragraph (B), or
(II) an antidumping or countervailing duty order based upon determination
described in clause (i) of subparagraph (B), or
(ii) the date of mailing of a determination described in clause (vi) of subparagraph
(B), an interested party who is a party to the proceeding in connection with
which the matter arises may commence an action in the United States Court of
International Trade by filing a summons, and within thirty days thereafter a
complaint.., contesting any factual findings or legal conclusions upon which
the determination is based.
19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2)(A) (1988). The standard of review for the court to apply in section
1516a(a)(2) actions is set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) as follows: "The court shall hold
unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found... (B) in an action brought under
paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section, to be unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 1516a(b)(1).
17. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1291-92.
18. Id Like the CIT, the Federal Circuit disposed of one claim by holding that
Nichimen's complaint failed to preserve the claim. Ia Nichimen's protest and complaint
stated that "[t]he determination upon which the United States relies in assessing the anti-
dumping duty was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with
law," but none of the specific paragraphs of the complaint or protest referenced the original
final antidumping determinations. Id. at 1290. Although final determinations reached since
1979 are not challengeable by protest, the 1971 determinations covering Nichimen's mer-
chandise would be because a transition provision of the 1979 Act, section 1002(b)(3), pre-
serves protest jurisdiction over such actions. Ia at 1289-90. The Federal Circuit, however,
agreed with the CIT that Nichimen was not seeking review of those determinations. Id.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (1988) states:
For the purpose of paragraph (1)(B) [periodic review of the amount of any an-
tidumping duty] the administering authority shall determine-
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Thus, the court properly held that Nichimen could not challenge
Customs' failure to make a determination on these subjects. 20
The court also found certain of Nichimen's claims implicitly fell
within Commerce's 751 jurisdiction-the claims that the determina-
tion on which the government relied in assessing the antidumping
duty was arbitrary and capricious and that the dumping findings
were erroneously applied because the manufacturer/exporter was
another company.21 The Federal Circuit thus held that, in con-
ducting reviews under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B), Commerce's juris-
diction is not limited to the determinations required by
§ 1675(a)(2). 22 In this respect, the Nichimen decision is consistent
with the court's prior decisions recognizing Commerce's broad au-
thority in conducting these reviews. 23
This aspect of the court's reasoning, however, makes somewhat
puzzling the court's decision that Nichimen had not failed to ex-
haust its administrative remedies concerning whether the Montgom-
ery Ward settlement agreement applied to the imports. The case
law from the Federal Circuit before Nichimen was consistent in hold-
ing that a litigant must first have exhausted administrative remedies
before the relevant agency if the agency was empowered to provide
the remedy sought.24 The court's previous decisions on other is-
(A) the foreign market value and United States price of each entry of merchandise
subject to the antidumping duty order and included within that determination, and
(B) the amount, if any, by which the foreign market value of each such entry ex-
ceeds the United States price of the entry.
The administering authority, without revealing confidential information, shall publish no-
tice of the results of the determination of antidumping duties in the Federal Register, and
that determination shall be the basis for the assessment of antidumping duties on entries
of the merchandise included within the determination and for deposits of estimated
duties.
19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (1988).
20. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1291-92.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. United States, 862 F.2d 1541, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(declaring that Secretary of Commerce is given broad discretion in administering antidump-
ing laws and upholding International Trade Administration's revocation of antidumping duty
order imposed on Korean carbon steel plate imports); Smith-Corona Group v. United States,
713 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that Secretary of Commerce has responsibility
for implementing antidumping law and has broad discretionary power for execution of same).
24. Compare National Corn Growers Assoc. v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (requiring protest and denial to Customs prior to suit challenging Customs' classifica-
tion of imports); Williams v. Secretary of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (requiring
exhaustion of military remedies prior to collateral attack on court martial conviction) with
Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (finding no need to seek annual review of antidumping duties when review would not
reach dispositive question of validity of antidumping margins in original determination);
Cooper v. Marsh, 807 F.2d 988, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding no need to seek review of court
martial conviction in Army Board for Correction of Military Records when Board is not em-
powered to set aside conviction).
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sues concerning the settlement agreement at issue in Nichimen would
have suggested that Commerce was empowered to provide the rem-
edy sought.25 The court has also held that the issue of whether a
section 751 review conforms to existing settlement agreements is
reviewable on appeal, and therefore has reversed CIT decisions
granting injunctions against the conduct of such reviews.2 6
The court did not explain why Nichimen did not fit into the estab-
lished doctrine that, where an administrative remedy exists, it must
be pursued before the court will entertain an appeal.2 7 The court
rested its decision on the fact that the settlement agreement was not
only between Commerce and Montgomery Ward.28 On this issue,
the court reasoned, "Because of the various parties and government
representatives involved in the settlement, Commerce should not
under the limited authority of section 751 be considered the proper
agency to interpret this agreement." 29 Why this should be the case,
if the court was applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies, is difficult to comprehend, and the court does not
explain.
By statute, Commerce is allocated the responsibility to "deter-
mine . . .the amount of the antidumping duty," and in this case
issued a preliminary notice stating what that duty would be in the
absence of a request for a 751 review.30 Nichimen regarded the
25. See Montgomery Ward v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1254 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(dismissing attempt to challenge validity of settlement agreement). The Federal Circuit's
predecessor court, in Montgomery Ward, described the relative responsibilities of the three
agencies that were parties to the agreement as follows:
The Secretary of Commerce acted on behalf of the Government with respect to [an-
tidumping duty claims not in litigation]. The Department of Justice settled the
claims upon which actions had been brought for collection of unpaid duty assess-
ments.... The Secretary of Treasury was responsible for and settled the claims for
civil penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 with respect to false documentation of entries.
Id. at 1256 n.1; see also Committee to Preserve Am. Color Television (COMPACT) v. United
States, 706 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming decision of CIT in refusing to set aside
agreements made between Secretary of Commerce and various importers subject to an-
tidumping duty).
26. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 547, 550, 645 F.
Supp. 939, 942 (1986) (granting injunction barring Commerce from making proposed re-
views), rev'd, 823 F.2d 505, 506 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (reversing injunction because Matsushita
could not demonstrate that it would be irreparably harmed by participating in reviews); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 455, 461-65, 688 F. Supp. 617,
621-24 (1988) (holding that CIT has jurisdiction over action by foreign manufacturers con-
testing delay in Commerce's review process as well as jurisdiction over Commerce's failure to
issue final revocation decision and that Commerce could conduct additional administrative
review for revocation of antidumping order, although statutory period for review has run),
aff'd, 861 F.2d 257, 260 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (declaring that Commerce has discretion to review
revocation decision prior to final determination).
27. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1292.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1287 (discussing Commerce notification to Nichimen on August 30, 1985);
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Montgomery Ward agreement as a defense to that proposed duty,
but did not bring the agreement to Commerce's attention." The
court did not indicate that Commerce did not have the power to
entertain that defense or that any party argued that pleading the
Montgomery Ward agreement to Commerce would have been futile.
Rather, the court concluded, "This is a matter properly falling
within the general category of protestable matters set forth in 19
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3)-'all charges or exactions of whatever character
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury.' "32 If this
conclusion indicates that the Department of Treasury (Treasury)
would be preferable to Commerce as an agency for interpreting the
scope of a settlement agreement on antidumping duties, the deci-
sion is problematic. First, under the terms of the settlement agree-
ment, Commerce was responsible for settlement of claims
concerning antidumping duties not then in litigation; Treasury, of
which Customs is a part, settled no issues concerning antidumping
duties.33 Second, section 1675 allocates to the administering au-
thority the responsibility to set the antidumping duty.3 4 If Treasury
disregards that duty in favor of a settlement agreement it regards as
binding, the potential exists for fractious and unnecessary inter-
agency conflict, as well as uncertainty as to the duties to be paid.3 5
In short, both under the settlement agreement and under the stat-
ute, Commerce would appear to have been the preferable agency,
indeed the sole agency authorized, to make the relevant determina-
tion; in any event, the Federal Circuit did not explain why Com-
merce would have been without power to make the determination,
as the existing law concerning exhaustion of administrative reme-
19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B) (1988) (describing responsibility of administering authority to re-
view and determine amount of antidumping duty).
31. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1287-88.
32. Idl at 1292 (claiming matter should not be decided under "limited authority" of sec-
tion 751 due to participation of many diverse parties).
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2) (1988),
which addresses Commerce's responsibilities in determining antidumping orders).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B) (1988).
35. In fact, 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1988) appears to acknowledge that antidumping deter-
minations are reviewable under section 1516a procedures rather than section 1514(a) proce-
dures. Section 1516a procedures first require section 1675 (section 751) review. See supra
note 10 (reprinting statutory language of section 1516(a)). Section 1514(b) states:
With respect to determinations made under section 1303 of this title or subtitle IV of
this chapter which are reviewable under section 1516a of this title, determinations of
the appropriate customs officer are final and conclusive upon all persons (including
the United States and any officer thereof) unless a civil action contesting a determi-
nation listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced in the United States Court of
International Trade.
19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (1988).
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dies would have suggested it should.3 6 The alternative seems to be
that the CIT would interpret the scope of the settlement agreement
in the first instance, a result that Congress would seem to have pre-
cluded by its statutory insistence on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.3 7 The court in Nichimen appears to have deviated from its
precedents concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies, but
because it did not discuss those precedents, the court probably did
not intend to change the doctrine announced in those earlier
decisions.38
B. Tolling of Time for Appeal
Under Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
as made applicable to the CIT by 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c), a private
party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), the lower court may,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, extend the time
for filing a notice upon motion filed not later than thirty days after
the time prescribed in Rule 4(a). The Rules of the United States
Court of International Trade provide for such a procedure in Rule
36. In Timken Co. v. United States, 777 F. Supp. 20 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991), the first case
decided under Nichimen, the CIT gave a limiting interpretation to that precedent. At issue was
whether Commerce, in its 751 review, had properly, under 19 U.S.C. § 1677g (1988), de-
clined to impose an interest payment. IdL at 22. Defendant-intervenor challenged jurisdic-
tion, citing Nichimen. Id. The court interpreted Nichimen to deny jurisdiction over claims too
far removed from Commerce's 751 determination to be considered ancillary. Id. at 23. The
court held that "unlike the ministerial function of duty collection" the applicability of section
1677g was the type of ancillary question within Commerce's sole discretion under a 751 re-
view and consequently found jurisdiction under Nichimen. Id at 24.
37. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (discussing statutory requirements of
administrative review).
38. The court in Nichimen also allowed the complaint to proceed on the issue of whether
Customs followed its standard procedures in liquidation of entries. Nichimen Am., Inc. v.
United States, 938 F.2d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This aspect of the court's decision does
not appear to give rise to the same ground for criticism as the court's decision concerning
jurisdiction to decide the scope of the settlement agreement, because Customs' procedures
are within its own authority, not Commerce's. If, however, the allegations were in fact a col-
lateral attack on Commerce's procedures in conducting its 751 review, then the CIT's deci-
sion to dismiss would seem to be appropriate. It is possible that the CIT's decision to dismiss
was premature, if the purport of this claim was not fully developed.
The distinction between "the ministerial function of duty collection" and whether a statu-
tory provision applies to the entry that, as noted supra note 36, the CIT made in Timken Co. v.
United States, 777 F. Supp. 20, 22-24 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991), cuts across the same divide
noted here. In Nichimen, whether Customs followed its procedures would fall on the "ministe-
rial" side of the divide, and whether a settlement agreement forbade ordinary application of
section 751 would fall on the other. Nichimen, 938 F.2d at 1291-92. The CIT in Timken can be
regarded as politely having criticized the Nichimen court for failing to realize'that Customs'
role in the collection of antidumping and countervailing duties is essentially ministerial.
Timken, 777 F. Supp. at 24. In Timken, the CIT noted that, unless it found jurisdiction, plaintiff
would "be left without any means to challenge [the] decision. The Court cannot envision this
result to be intended by our appellate court." Id. at 23.
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59(b) which states that a motion for a new trial or rehearing "shall
be served and filed" within thirty days of the entry of judgment.39
Until January 1, 1991, Rule 5(g) of the Rules of the United States
Court of International Trade provided that service of a pleading or
paper by mail is completed when received, except that when service
is effected by registered or certified mail, the document is deemed
served as of the date of mailing.40
In Penrod Drilling Co. v. United States,4 1 plaintiff filed a motion in the
CIT for rehearing on the thirtieth day following the entry of judg-
ment, but plaintiff's service of that motion on the government, sent
by ordinary mail on the preceding day, was not received by the thir-
tieth day and, indeed, was never received. 42 Believing the time for
filing its appeal had been tolled, Penrod did not file a notice of ap-
peal of the judgment with the Federal Circuit within the required
time period.43
In Penrod, the Federal Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion the
lower court's decision that plaintiff had failed to make a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause required for an extension of time
for appeal under Rule 4(a)(5). 4 4 The Federal Circuit affirmed, not-
ing that under the CIT rules, Penrod could have served the govern-
ment by certified or registered mail or delivered its service copy by
hand to the office of the Commercial Branch of the Civil Division of
the Justice Department, which is located in the same building as the
CIT, where plaintiff hand delivered its filing.45 Further, the Federal
Circuit observed that counsel for plaintiff could have contacted de-
fense counsel when no answer to plaintiff's motion for rehearing
was received and, finding that the motion had not been served,
plaintiff would still have had time to file a notice of appeal.46 Like
the CIT, the Federal Circuit found Penrod's attempted distinction
between the late delivery of mail and the nondelivery of mail to be
39. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 59(b). The parallel Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides for service of a motion for a new trial no later than ten days after the entry of
judgment. FED. R. CIv. P. 59(c).
40. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 5(g).
41. 925 F.2d 406 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
42. Penrod Drilling Co. v. United States, 925 F.2d 406, 408 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding
decision of CIT that determined failure to file timely notice ofappeal did not result from good
cause or excusable neglect); see FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) ("The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon mo-
tion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)
[for the filing of a notice of appeal.]").
43. Penrod, 925 F.2d at 408.
44. Id.; see Penrod Drilling Co. v. United States, 740 F. Supp. 858, 859 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990) (dismissing action to recover duties assessed by Customs because party was not entitled
to extension of time for appeal).
45. Penrod, 925 F.2d at 408.
46. Id. at 409.
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inadequate. 47
The CIT rules have now changed so that the particular dilemma
faced by the plaintiff in Penrod should not recur. The CIT has elimi-
nated Rule 5(g) and has instead amended Rule 5(b) to state,
"[s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing." 48 Further, CIT Rule
5(e) now states that filing is complete when received, except that a
paper properly sent by registered or certified mail is deemed filed as
of the date of mailing.49
II. CUSTOMS
A. Classification
The Federal Circuit reviews decisions of the CIT regarding the
interpretation of tariff provisions de novo, as questions of law, and
reviews findings of fact by the CIT concerning the imports at issue
under the clearly erroneous standard.50 In Clipper Belt Lacer Co., Inc.
v. United States,51 the court reviewed a CIT decision affirming Cus-
toms' classification of certain heavy-duty fasteners used for joining
together the ends or sections of conveyer belts used in transporting
heavy materials.5 2 The court affirmed on the basis of its "agree-
ment" with the CIT's analysis of the recorded evidence that the fas-
teners did not qualify for classification under either Tariff Schedules
of the United States (TSUS) 646.20 or 646.32, a mixed decision of
law and fact because those classifications require products to be
"staples.15 3 In determining that the fasteners at issue were not
"staples," the court below both interpreted the meaning of the term
"staples" and made findings about the nature of the product.5 4
The Federal Circuit then considered an alternative claim, namely
that the belt fasteners were properly classifiable under Item 664.10
47. Id.; see Penrod, 740 F. Supp. at 859.
48. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 5(b). The Court of International Trade Rule on this point now
conforms to the parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b).
49. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 5(e).
50. See Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1116, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing CIT
as clearly erroneous and holding that plastic figures and doll accessories each constitute
"unit" for purposes of duty exemption for toys with unit value of five cents or less); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. United States, 889 F.2d 267, 268 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that decision of
CIT to classify power supplies for computers as parts of automated data processing machines
was not clearly erroneous); Hasbro Indus., Inc. v. United States, 879 F.2d 838, 840 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (affirming decision of CIT that "GIJoe action figures" are dolls and not "toy figures of
animate objects" and thus hold ng that CIT decision was not clearly erroneous).
51. 923 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
52. Clipper Belt Lacer Co. v. United States, 923 F.2d 835, 835-36 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
53. Id. at 837-38 (declaring that "staples" refers to common meaning of term although
CIT discussed issue at some length prior to concluding that imports in case were not staples).
54. Id.
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as parts of belt conveyers. 55 Headnote 1 to Part 4 of Schedule 6 of
the TSUS, within which the TSUS item falls, excludes from its cov-
erage belts and belting and parts of articles specifically provided for
elsewhere in the schedules. 56 The Federal Circuit held as a matter
of law that, since belts and belting are excluded from the headnote,
fasteners that are part of the flexible belt system are not to be classi-
fied as parts of the conveyer, a piece of mechanical machinery. 57
The court's reasoning deserves some note. Whereas the CIT was
bound to reason by analogy to the Customs Court's decisions in-
volving other exclusionary headnotes, the Federal Circuit did not
discuss them on the grounds that it is not bound by Customs Court
decisions.58 Rather, it simply concluded that "it seems to us to
make good sense to assume, since appellant produced no evidence
to the contrary," that parts of belts are excluded by a headnote ex-
cluding belts. 59 As will be seen in the discussion below of other
cases, the Federal Circuit, in some cases, does pay great attention to
the effect of its decision on CIT precedents. 60
In Bakelite Thermosets, Ltd. v. United States 61 and P.F. Palos v. United
States,62 the Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of the CIT. Bake-
lite addressed the issue of whether an asphalt emulsion that was
eight percent wax should be classified as "asphalt" under TSUS
521.11 or, as Customs had done, as "[m]ineral substances, and arti-
cles of mineral substances, not specially provided for: Other: Not
decorated," under item 523.91.63 On appeal to the Federal Circuit,
plaintiff did not challenge the CIT's factual finding that the im-
ported emulsion results in a product in which both asphalt and wax
perform important permanent functions in end use.64 In adopting
the CIT's decision, the Federal Circuit, in Bakelite, adopted the lower
court's limiting interpretation of United States v. Central Westrumite
Co.,65 in which the court found a product to be asphalt notwith-
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id. at 837-38.
58. Id. at 838.
59. Id.
60. In general, the court seems less likely to address CIT precedents in customs cases
than in antidumping cases. This difference may be surprising in that General Interpretive
Headnote 10(a) specifies that headnotes and provisions of the TSUS are to be interpreted
subject to rules of interpretation, not inconsistent with the rules set out in the TSUS "as have
been or may be developed under administrative or judicial rulings."
61. 926 F.2d 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
62. 926 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
63. Bakelite Thermosets, Ltd. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1145, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 1146.
65. 1 Ct. Cust. 400 (1911).
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standing the addition of other materials. 66 The court distinguished
Westrumite because the materials added to that product simply aided
combination and application of the product, whereas in Bakelite the
wax performed an important permanent function in the waterproof-
ing of gypsum board.67
In P.F. Palos v. United States,68 the CIT and the Federal Circuit
were concerned with what constituted the uppers of footwear. 69
The imports were molded pieces of semi-rigid clear plastic in the
shape of the sole of a shoe, having a nib or protrusion of plastic that
contained a hole in the front and two holes in the back through
which a lace or thong was attached after importation to create a fin-
ished sandal.70 The CIT rejected plaintiff's contention that the nib
or protrusion was an "upper," relying on the Court of Customs Ap-
peals' decision in United States v. Skolai 7t that fabric straps and
thongs on wooden clogs partially covering the foot and holding the
sole in place were an "upper" within the common meaning.72 Be-
cause the straps attached to the Palos imports after importation
serve the same function, the CIT held the imported soles not to con-
tain uppers. 73 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court's reasoning but also held that Skolai supports the outcome in-
dependently of the fact that thongs were added after importation-
namely, that the nib fits between the toes rather than partially cover-
ing the foot and does not hold the sole in place. 74
The Federal Circuit again adopted the lower court's decision on
customs classification in E. T. Horn Co. v. United States,75 which ad-
dressed whether certain chemical residues of manufacturing
processes were classifiable as "[m]ixtures of two or more organic
66. Bakelite, 926 F.2d at 1145-46 (affirming Bakelite Thermosets, Ltd. v. United States,
744 F. Supp. 1164 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), which adopts Customs' classification of substance in
question as "[m]ineral substances" rather than as "asphaltum" as importer desired).
67. Bakelite, 744 F. Supp. at 1166.
68. 737 F. Supp. 1191 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), aft'd, 926 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
69. P.F. Palos v. United States, 737 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-97 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), aff'd,
926 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In Palos, the CIT noted that Customs classified the imports as
"[o]ther footwear," falling under TSUS item 700.60, while plaintiff claimed them to be
"[o]ther footwear... : [hiaving uppers of which over 90 percent of the exterior surface area
is rubber or plastics," under item 700.58. Id. at 1192, 1197. The CIT also engaged in an
extended discussion of the case law concerning when footwear is "substantially complete."
Id. at 1195-96. Because the Federal Circuit held the issue to be conceded in the case, its
review of the precedents appears to be dictum. See Palos, 926 F.2d at 1179 (reflecting CIT's
discussion on what constitutes "uppers" of footwear).
70. Palos, 926 F.2d at 1179.
71. 14 Ct. Cust. 392 (1927).
72. Palos, 737 F. Supp. at 1194-95 (relying on United States v. Skolai, 14 Ct. Cust. 392,
397 (1927) (determining that upper holds sole in place and partially covers foot)).
73. Id. at 1195.
74. Palos, 926 F.2d at 1179.
75. 945 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991), aff'g 752 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
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compounds: .... Other," TSUS item 430.20, or as "[w]aste and
scrap not specially provided for," TSUS item 793.00.76 The head-
note governing item 430.20 states that it covers "chemicals, except
those provided for elsewhere in this schedule and those specially
provided for in any of the other schedules."' 77 After reviewing the
common definitions of "chemical" and "waste," as well as the legis-
lative and administrative histories of the provisions, the court held
that when chemical products have identifiable useful chemical
properties, are useful, are traded for those properties, and are used
as is to make desired end products, they cannot be classified as
waste, even when they are produced as unsought residues.78
Rather than adopt the CIT's decision, the court in W.R. Filbin &
Co. v. United States 79 took the occasion to reiterate succinctly its stan-
dards of review. At issue was whether frozen ice pops were properly
classifiable as "edible preparations not specifically provided for,"
pursuant to TSUS item 183.05, when classification under that item
requires the merchandise to fall within Headnote 1 of Schedule 1,
Part 12, Subpart B and to be "products fit for use as beverages."' 0
Following the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision in
Wah Shang Co. v. United States,81 the CIT held that determining
whether a product was "fit for use" as a beverage required an exam-
ination of whether the product had a "substantial actual use" as a
beverage. 82 The Federal Circuit reviewed the interpretation of
terms de novo and held that the CIT had applied the law correctly
because, in determining whether the pops' possible use as a bever-
age was a "substantial actual use," the court had explicitly stated
that it did not require such a use to be the "chief use."8' 3 In review-
ing the factual findings, quoting the Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,84 the court emphasized that the
clearly erroneous standard applies and that even greater deference
is due when the lower court's findings depend on observation of the
credibility of witnesses. 85 The Federal Circuit upheld the CIT
76. E.T. Horn Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1540, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991), aff'g 752 F.
Supp. 476 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
77. Id. at 1542 (quoting Headnote 1, TSUS Schedule 4, Part 2 (1983)).
78. See id. at 1545 (declaring that residue does not necessarily constitute waste entitling
producer to duty free entry).
79. 945 F.2d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80. See W.R. Filbin & Co. v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 289, 292 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990)
(affirming Customs' classification of product as "edible preparation" and not as "beverage"),
aft'd, 945 F.2d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
81. 44 C.C.P.A. 155, 159, C.A.D. 654 (1957).
82. W.R. Filbin, 744 F. Supp. at 291.
83. W.R. Filbin, 945 F.2d at 392.
84. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
85. See W.R. Filbin, 945 F.2d at 392 (stating that court will rarely find error in trial court's
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judge's findings, which included resolving conflicting testimony.8 6
B. Drawback
Drawback is a refund or remission under qualified circumstances
of a customs duty, tax, or fee that is paid on imported merchandise
upon their exportation.8 7 To qualify for a drawback, a manufacturer
or producer must comply with the Customs Service's regulations
governing recordkeeping.88 In Aurea Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. United
States,8 9 plaintiff claimed that its wholly owned subsidiary responsi-
ble for the production process misplaced the required records when
the subsidiary went out of business. 90 Customs refused drawback,
finding the substitute documents that Aurea submitted to establish
the dates of manufacture and manufacturing lot numbers to be defi-
cient.9 1 The CIT, however, found Aurea's documentary and testi-
monial evidence sufficient and ordered Customs to allow
drawbacks. 92 The Federal Circuit affirmed the order, upholding the
CIT's decision that the regulations required creation of the records,
but that testimonial evidence establishing existence of the required
records is sufficient to overcome failure to produce them.93 The
Federal Circuit elaborated on the lower court's reasoning by distin-
guishing two issues that testimony could properly address: (1)
whether the appropriate documentation was maintained as the regu-
finding when considering documentary evidence and will give additional deference to trial
court's assessment of credibility of witnesses); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 565 (1985) (reversing appeals court decision as misapplication of clearly erroneous
standard because trial court's finding was plausible and therefore worthy of deference).
86. W.R. Filbin, 945 F.2d at 392-93.
87. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1988). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Upon the exportation of articles manufactured or produced in the United States
with the use of imported merchandise, the full amount of the duties paid upon the
merchandise so used shall be refunded as drawback, less 1 per centum of such duties,
except that such duties shall not be so refunded upon the exportation of flour or by-
products produced from wheat imported after ninety days after June 17, 1930.
Where two or more products result from the manipulation of imported merchandise,
the drawback shall be distributed to the several products in accordance with their
relative values at the time of separation.
Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 191.2(a) (1991) (defining drawback as "a refund or remission, in whole or
in part, of a customs duty, internal revenue tax, or fee lawfully assessed or collected because
of a particular use made of the merchandise on which the duty, tax, or fee was assessed or
collected").
88. 19 C.F.R. § 191 (1991); see id. § 191.5 ("All records required to be kept by the manu-
facturer or producer under this part with respect to drawback claims ... shall be retained for
at least 3 years after payment of such claims.").
89. 932 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
90. Aurea Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. United States, 932 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91. Id.
92. See id. (discussing how CIT determined that Aurea Jewelry provided sufficient evi-
dence warranting drawback); see also Aurea Jewelry Creations v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l
Trade 712, 715-16 (1989) (ordering Customs to refund Aurea for paid duties and interest).
93. AureaJewelry, 932 F.2d at 946.
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lation required; and (2) whether the documentation adequately es-
tablished the right to a drawback. 94
Drawback can also occur if, within three years of importation,
merchandise that is fungible and in the same condition as the im-
ported goods is exported or destroyed. 95 Customs' regulations de-
fine "fungible merchandise" as "merchandise which for commercial
purposes is identical and interchangeable in all situations." 96 In
Guess?, Inc. v. United States,97 the CIT granted summary judgment in
favor of Customs' denial of drawback for jeans imported from Hong
Kong in view of an admission by plaintiff's import manager that
plaintiff exported only U.S.-produced jeans because its foreign cus-
tomers demanded them.98
The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the interpretation of the
governing statute and regulations and whether genuine issues of
material fact existed.9 9 As had the CIT, the court held that Cus-
toms' interpretation of "fungible," as meaning identical for com-
mercial purposes, was reasonable and in accordance with the
legislative history, and thus entitled to deference.100 The Federal
94. See id. (discussing two-pronged inquiry to satisfy requirements of drawback provi-
sions via testimonial evidence).
95. 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j)(2) (1988). The provision states that:
(2) If there is, with respect to imported merchandise on which was paid any duty,
tax, or fee imposed under Federal law because of its importation, any other merchan-
dise (whether imported or domestic) that-
(A) is fungible with such imported merchandise;
(B) is, before the close of the three-year period beginning on the date of importation
of the imported merchandise, either exported or destroyed under Customs
supervision;
(C) before such exportation or destruction-
(i) is not used within the United States, and
(ii) is in the possession of the party claiming drawback under this paragraph;
and
(D) is in the same condition at the time of exportation or destruction as was the
imported merchandise at the time of its importation;
then upon the exportation or destruction of such other merchandise the amount of each
such duty, tax, and fee paid regarding the imported merchandise shall be refunded as
drawback, but in no case may the total drawback on the imported merchandise, whether
available under this paragraph or any other provision of law or any combination thereof,
exceed 99 percent of that duty, tax, or fee.
Id.
96. 19 C.F.R. § 191.2(l) (1991).
97. 752 F. Supp. 463 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), rev'd, 944 F.2d 855 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
98. Guess?, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 463, 466 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) (finding
that fungibility was destroyed between imported and exported jeans due to customer prefer-
ence for jeans with "Made in U.S.A." label and thus manufacturer was not entitled to draw-
back), rev'd, 944 F.2d 855 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
99. Guess?, Inc. v. United States, 944 F.2d 855, 857-58 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing and
remanding to resolve dispute of material fact as to whether some foreign customers actually
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Circuit held, however, that the testimony of other Guess?, Inc. em-
ployees to the effect that U.S.-made and Hong Kong-madejeans are
commercially interchangeable among foreign customers created a
genuine dispute of material fact. 10' A majority of the panel held
that, even if Guess?, Inc. believed subjectively that foreign custom-
ers might prefer a "Made in the U.S.A." label, the decisive issue was
whether some foreign customers, in fact, demanded U.S.-made
jeans because of the origin of the label.'0 2 Judge Plager, concur-
ring, would have included Guess?, Inc.'s subjective belief as a rele-
vant fact.10 3
Drawback is also authorized in certain circumstances upon expor-
tation from a foreign trade zone. In Chrysler Motors Corp. v. United
States,10 4 the Federal Circuit adopted a CIT decision that upheld
Customs' decision to change its interpretation of the circumstances
in which such drawback would apply. 10 5 In 1984 and 1985, Customs
issued two rulings that permitted merchandise to be considered as
exported for the purpose of drawback when it was sent to a foreign
trade zone for the purpose of manufacturing. 0 6 Relying on those
rulings, Chrysler established an as-needed supply system, under
which it purchased imported components from vendors who ware-
housed and tested the components in the United States for delivery
to Chrysler's manufacturing facilities in foreign trade zones.' 0 7 The
CIT discussed the fact that Customs adopted a final rule that inter-
preted the Foreign Trade Zones Act as providing no authority for
considering merchandise exported when it was sent to a foreign
trade zone for manufacturing.10 8 Under the new rule, Customs in-
terpreted 19 U.S.C. §§ 81c(a) and 1313(j) to allow drawback on
merchandise admitted to a zone only when it was brought into the
101. Id. at 858.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 858-59 (PlagerJ., concurring) (maintaining that both customers' demands and
subjective "corporate reasoning" should be weighed in determining whether fungibility is
present).
104. 945 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
105. Chrysler Motor Corp. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1187, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1991), aft'g
without opinion 755 F. Supp. 388 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
106. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 388, 394 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990) (discussing previous Customs' rulings which allowed payment of drawback for im-
ported merchandise transferred to foreign trade zone for manufacturing of automobiles for
domestic purchase, with reference to 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1069 (1984), and 19 Cust. B. & Dec.
509 (1985) and Headquarters Ruling Letter 218551 (Jan. 29, 1986)).
107. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1187, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
108. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F. Supp. at 394 (discussing 76 T.D. 89-4, 53 Fed. Reg.
52,411, 52,414 (Dec. 28, 1988) (Treasury Decision) which concluded that no drawback was
authorized when merchandise was sent to foreign trade zone in United States). See generally
Foreign Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81 (1991) (authorizing establishment of "foreign trade
zones" within physical territory of United States into which merchandise may be imported
without being subject to United States Customs laws).
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zone solely for the purpose of exportation or destruction. 0 9 The
new rule reversed the prior rulings and Chrysler protested the de-
nial of drawback. 01
The Court of International Trade held that Customs' new inter-
pretation was in accord with the plain, unambiguous meaning of the
statute and found that conclusion reenforced by the relevant legisla-
tive history."' The court observed that Customs changed its inter-
pretation after a notice and comment proceeding.12 Moreover,
quoting Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States," 13 another CIT
decision adopted by the Federal Circuit, the court in Chrysler held
that "[a]s long as the new interpretation is consistent with Congres-
sional intent, an agency may make a 'course correction.' "''4
C. Interest
In Kalan, Inc. v. United States,' ' 5 plaintiff, who through earlier liti-
gation had succeeded in overturning Customs' classification of its
merchandise and obtained reliquidation of its entries, sued to ob-
tain interest on the refunded duties. 1 6 The government consented
109. T.D. 89-4, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,411, 52,414 (Dec. 28, 1988) (providing that because For-
eign Trade Zones Act did not permit products to be deemed exported when sent to foreign
trade zone in United States for manufacturing, no claims for drawback should be authorized).
19 C.F.R. § 191.4(14) (1991) provides for drawback
in accordance with the fourth proviso of section 3 of the Foreign Trade Zones Act of
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 81c), on merchandise transferred to a for-
eign trade zone from Customs territory for the sole purpose of exportation, destruc-
tion (except destruction of distilled spirits, wines, and fermented malt liquors), or
storage.
Id
The fourth proviso of 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) provides in relevant part that
under the rules and regulations of the controlling federal agencies, articles which
have been taken into a zone from customs territory for the sole purpose of exporta-
tion, destruction (except destruction of distilled spirits, wines, and fermented malt
liquors), or storage shall be considered to be exported for the purpose of... draw-
back, warehousing, and bonding, or any other provisions of the TariffAct of 1930, as
amended, and the regulations thereunder ....
19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (1988). 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j) provides for drawback if imported merchan-
dise on which duty has been paid is, within three years of importation "(i) exported in the
same condition as when imported, or (ii) destroyed under Customs supervision; and [ ... ] is
not used within the United States before such exportation or destruction." Id. § 1313(j).
110. Chrysler Motors Inc., 755 F. Supp. at 393.
111. Id at 394-96 (discussing legislative history of foreign trade zones).
112. Id. at 396 (stating that Customs gave notice of intention to revoke prior rulings
granting drawbacks).
113. 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 178, 585 F. Supp. 649 (1984), aft'd, 753 F.2d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
114. Chrysler Motors, Inc., 755 F. Supp. at 396 (quoting Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v.
United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 178, 193, 585 F. Supp. 649, 661 (1984), aft'd, 753 F.2d 1061
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
115. 944 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Dec. 6,
1991) (No. 91-918).
116. Kalan, Inc. v. United States, 944 F.2d 847, 848 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60
U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992) (No. 91-918). The Court of International Trade over-
1000
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to pay interest running from the date on which Kalan filed its sum-
mons to the date of the refund, following the decision in the original
litigation, but Kalan sought interest from the date on which it had
originally paid estimated duties on the entries.1 17 The CIT allowed
only additional interest from the date Customs liquidated the en-
tries-i.e., earlier than the date to which the government consented,
but later than the date Kalan sought.' 1 8 The Federal Circuit, revers-
ing the CIT, applied the standard set forth in Library of Congress v.
Shaw,' 19 which requires that, for interest to be awardable against the
United States, the statute must contain an express consent to the
award of interest separate from the general waiver of immunity to
suit. 120 An importer may recover interest on amounts "paid as in-
creased or additional duties under section 1505(c) . . ."-i.e., those
due upon liquidation or reliquidation according to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1520(d). 121 The Federal Circuit held that the government owed
Kalan no interest, concluding that, because Customs determined
that the amount Kalan deposited as estimated duties at the time of
entry satisfied its tariff obligations under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(a), Kalan
never paid "increased or additional" duties.' 22 The court held that
19 U.S.C. § 1520(a) authorized a refund of duties overpaid, but
turned Customs' classification of the merchandise in Kalan, Inc. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l
Trade 1142, 1146 (1988).
117. Kalan, 944 F.2d at 849.
118. Kalan, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 455, 456 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), rev'd, 944
F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1992) (No. 91-918).
119. 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
120. See Kalan, 944 F.2d at 847 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314
(1986)).
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (1988). The full text of section 1520(d) is as follows:
If a determination is made to reliquidate an entry as a result of a protest filed
under section 1514 of this title or an application for relief made under subsection
(c)(1) of this section, or if reliquidation is ordered by an appropriate court, interest
shall be allowed on any amount paid as increased or additional duties under section
1505(c) of this title at the annual rate established pursuant to that section and deter-
mined as of the 15th day after the date of liquidation or reliquidation. The interest
shall be calculated from the date of payment to the date of (1) the refund, or (2) the
filing of a summons under section 2632 of Title 28, whichever occurs first.
Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (1988) provides as follows:
Duties determined to be due upon liquidation or reliquidation shall be due 15 days
after the date of that liquidation or reliquidation, and unless payment of the duties is
received by the appropriate customs officer within 30 days after that date, shall be
considered delinquent and bear interest from the 15th day after the date of liquida-
tion or reliquidation at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Id.
122. Kalan, 944 F.2d at 850. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (1988) provides as follows:
Unless merchandise is entered for warehouse or transportation, or under bond,
the importer of record shall deposit with the appropriate customs officer at the time
of making entry, or at such later time as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation
(but not to exceed thirty days after the date of entry), the amount of duties estimated
by such customs officer to be payable thereon.
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nothing more. 123
III. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
A. The Definition of Subsidies
United States law, under certain circumstances, allows the levying
of duties equal to the net amounts of bounties or grants, also known
as "subsidies," given to foreign industries exporting to the United
States.1 24 How specifically a foreign subsidy must benefit a pro-
ducer of exports to the United States in order to be subject to a
countervailing duty is one of the most important issues in counter-
vailing duty law. Until the CIT's 1985 decision in Cabot Corp. v.
123. See Kalan, 944 F.2d at 850 (noting that § 1520(a), sole statutory provision dealing
with refund of excess deposits, is silent about addition of interests).
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988). Section 1303(a)(1) provides the following:
Except in the case of an article or merchandise which is the product of a country
under the Agreement (within the meaning of section 1671(b) of this title), whenever
any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of govern-
ment, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow,
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or
export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, then
upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States, whether
the same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and
whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when ex-
ported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by
remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addi-
tion to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty
or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
Id. § 1303(a)(1); see id. § 1677(5)(A) (stating that "subsidy" has same meaning as term
"bounty or grant"). Section 1303 is applicable when the product is from a country that is not
"under the Agreement" as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1988). Id. § 1303(a)(1). In gen-
eral, a country is "under the Agreement" if it is a member of and/or adheres to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. See
id. § 1671(b) (defining "under Agreement"). As for countries under the Agreement, the ap-
plicable statute is 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1988). This statute states, in part, the following:
(A) In general
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that
term is used in section 1303 of this title and includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
(i) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to
illustrative list of export subsidies).
(ii) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government
action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,
whether publicly or privately owned and whether paid or bestowed directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of
merchandise:
(I) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations.
(II) The provisions of goods or services at preferential rates.
(III) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
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United States,125 Commerce held that a subsidy did not qualify as a
countervailable bounty or grant if it was generally available to com-
panies in the foreign country. 126 Judge Carman in Cabot rejected
such a per se test, holding instead that Commerce needed to con-
duct an investigation into how a nominally generally available sub-
sidy was in fact awarded.' 27 As Judge Michel recounted in his
dissenting opinion in PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States,'12 a string of
CIT decisions followed the Cabot decision's lead. 29 In 1988, Con-
gress amended the countervailing duty law to proscribe a finding
that a bounty or grant was not countervailable simply because it was
"'nominally generally available."' 30
125. 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 489, 620 F. Supp. 722, dismissed as inapplicable, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
126. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 229, 231, 564 F.
Supp. 834, 836-37 (1983) (providing Department of Commerce's interpretation that tax de-
duction generally available to Korean manufacturers for accelerated depredation of equip-
ment failed to be bounty or grant because it was not preferential to particular manufacturers).
127. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 489, 498, 620 F. Supp. 722, 723,
dismissed as inapplicable, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that Commerce's interpretation
was unacceptable and that investigations should focus on whether implementation of benefits
resulted in special bestowals and competitive advantage to specific enterprises).
128. 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
129. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Michel,
J., dissenting) (arguing that court's decision threatens to revive statutorily incorrect general
availability test and citing cases applying correct test as derived in Cabot); see also Roses, Inc. v.
United States, 743 F. Supp. 870, 879 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) (following Cabot and determining
that International Trade Administration should have determined whether benefit in fact had
been bestowed on Mexican flower industry rather than applying general availability test);
Armco Inc. v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1514, 1530 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) (following Cabot
and rejecting International Trade Administration's finding that Malaysian tax abatements did
not qualify as bounties or grants to Malaysian steel industry since abatements were generally
available to all industries); Comeau Seafoods Ltd. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 923,
931, 724 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (1989) (applying Cabot's requirement that actual results or ef-
fects of benefits must be examined rather than general availability of benefits in determining
whether assistance programs available to Canadian fishing industry were countervailable). In
PPG, ChiefJudge Nies also cited cases in line with Cabot. PPG, 928 F.2d at 1577; see Alberta
Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 563, 567, 669 F. Supp. 445,450
(1987) (determining whether various Canadian assistance programs available to pork produ-
cers were countervailable by assessing, as in Cabot, whether benefits were actually conferred
upon specific industry); Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 424,427-28,664 F.
Supp. 1444, 1448 (1987) (interpreting Cabot and concluding that in determining whether ben-
efits available to Mexican lime producers were countervailable, court must assess if benefits
were specifically bestowed upon lime producing industry).
The Government sought to appeal Cabot when the decision issued, but the Federal Circuit
dismissed the appeal as interlocutory. See Cabot, 788 F.2d at 1543 (concluding that where trial
court remands to administrative agency, remand is unappealable). The issue thus waited six
years before it reached the court of appeals. Officials of the Department of Commerce have
criticized the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional decision in Cabot both as a legal matter and for
the effect that it has on the development of the substantive law. See generally Proceedings of the
Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade, 120 F.RD. 543, 564-66
(1987).
130. Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. I, § 1312, 102 Stat. 1184 (1988) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)). The relevant portion of this provision states:
Nominal general availability under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule
establishing a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:983
PPG concerned a determination by Commerce, made prior to
Cabot, that Mexican government programs designed to protect ex-
porters from exchange rate risks and to control prices for the sale of
natural gas were not "bounties or grants" within 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a).13 1 In the court below, Judge Carman, the same judge
who decided Cabot, upheld Commerce's determination. 3 2 A di-
vided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed.133 The way in which the
panel divided leaves the significance of the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in some doubt. Senior CircuitJudge Smith joined in the result,
but did not join ChiefJudge Nies' opinion or file one of his own. 134
Judge Michel in dissent observed that, in these circumstances, there
is no opinion of the court, and the opinion therefore does not have
the force of precedent. 3 5 To reenforce his point, he waxed ironic,
stating, "[t]his jurisprudential truth, however, likely will be lost
when the bar reads and cites that opinion."' 3 6
Notwithstanding Judge Michel's cautions, there appears to be
more agreement than disagreement, and consequently significant
precedent, in the PPG opinions. The disagreement may concern
less what the law should be than what was at issue in the appeal.
First, both Chief Judge Nies and Judge Michel rejected appellant's
argument that "bounty or grant" includes any benefit that allows
goods to be sold for less in the United States than would otherwise
be the case.137 Second, both rejected the proposition that the exist-
ence of eligibility requirements suffices to make a benefit sufficiently
specific to qualify as a bounty or grant.13 8 Third, both approved the
line of CIT decisions that require a case-by-case inquiry into
whether a nominally generally available program disproportionately
benefits a specific industry or group of industries. 3 9 Fourth, both
determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact pro-
vided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.
Id.
131. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 344, 345-47, 662 F. Supp.
258, 260-62 (1987) (setting out facts of case), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also
supra note 124 (providing text of 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1988)).
132. PPG, I 1 Ct. Int'l Trade at 362, 662 F. Supp. at 272.
133. PPG, 928 F.2d at 1579.
134. See id. (noting merely thatJudge Smith concurred in result).
135. Id. at 1580 (MichelJ., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1573 (agreeing with International Trade Administration that language of 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) restricts meaning of "bounty or grant"); id. at 1580 (Michel, J., dissent-
ing) (finding effects of benefit, not merely whether benefits exist, must be focus of analysis).
138. Id. at 1578. The ChiefJudge's discussion is explicit, while judge Michel's judgment
on this point is implicit in his conclusion that the proceeding should be remanded to Com-
merce for investigation of whether the program benefits are sufficiently specific. See id. at
1584 (Michel, J., dissenting) (finding remand is only proper course).
139. See id. at 1577 (finding cases to be in accord with case-by-case specific standard); id. at
1580, 1581 (Michel, J., dissenting) (recognizing that consistent line of cases requires inquiry
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rejected, Chief Judge Nies explicitly and Judge Michel implicitly,
PPG's argument that a bounty is specifically directed enough to be
countervailable if its recipients are simply identifiable. 140
Chief Judge Nies and Judge Michel disagreed, however, on
whether the court should remand the decision and require Com-
merce to investigate whether the Mexican government awarded
preferential discounted natural gas rates, nominally available to all
domestic industries, on a disproportionate basis to the float glass
industry. 141 Judge Michel found the answer dear: Commerce's
statement of reasons for not finding the program countervailable
rested simply on the fact that the published price for natural gas was
available to all industries.1 42 Commerce, therefore, failed to make
the investigation as required by the Cabot line of cases-which both
judges adopted in PPG.143
Chief Judge Nies did not reach this question. Quoting the same
finding that Judge Michel cited as establishing the inadequacy of
Commerce's investigation, she stated, "Before the ITA and the
Court of International Trade, PPG asserted that preferential dis-
counted natural gas rates were given to the float glass industry as
compared to other industries .... This issue is not raised on ap-
peal."1 44 Chief Judge Nies thus did not address whether the Mexi-
can natural gas program disproportionately benefitted the float
glass industry or whether Commerce adequately investigated the
question. She found instead that PPG was making a different argu-
ment before the Federal Circuit-namely, that the program dispro-
portionately benefitted a broader category of "energy intensive"
into whether disproportionate benefits create competitive advantage for specific foreign com-
pany or industry); see also supra note 129 (providing citation to cases). Although the 1988
amendment to the countervailing duty statute would seem to make this basic proposition a
moot point, there are a number of cases involving pre-1988 determinations pending in the
Court of International Trade.
140. See PPG, 928 F.2d at 1577 (observing that nothing in statute mandates that specificity
is met if recipients of subsidy are identifiable); id. at 1582 (Michel, J., dissenting) (noting PPG
argued more than specificity based merely on recipients being identifiable; thus International
Trade Administration was obligated to investigate).
141. See id at 1579 (holding natural gas programs are not countervailable and affirming
trial court decision); id. at 1584 (Michel, J., dissenting) (concluding court should not affirm
lower court decision and should remand for International Trade Administration to apply cor-
rect statutory test).
142. Id. at 1580 (Michel, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 1581 (Michel, J., dissenting) (noting International Trade Administration
made none of required Cabot inquiries); supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing
adoption of Cabot line of cases by both majority and dissent).
144. Id. at 1578; see id. (providing statement from International Trade Administration that
natural gas program did not confer benefit upon float gas companies since they paid same
price available to all other industries).
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industries. 145 Accordingly, she held that Commerce acted properly
in declining to make energy intensive industries a specific group of
industries for purposes of deciding whether a bounty was de facto
benefiting a group of industries.146 Judge Michel's dissenting opin-
ion did not address the energy-intensive industry question.
The disagreement between the two judges may involve no more
than a difference concerning what is necessary to preserve an issue
on appeal to the Federal Circuit, an issue the two opinions did not
explicitly address. Judge Michel did not discuss how PPG brought,
in either its briefs or its oral arguments, the issue of the adequacy of
Commerce's investigation to the court's attention. He mentioned
that PPG had no burden of proof before the agency,' 47 but because
ChiefJudge Nies did not preclude PPG from raising the issue before
the agency or the CIT, Judge Michel's observation does not address
her objection to the Federal Circuit's considering the question.1 48
Judge Michel asked, "What vitality will [the Cabot line of] CIT de-
cisions have in view of our court's result in PPG Industries?"'149 To
this author, at least, the answer seems to be that the vitality of that
line of decisions is undiminished, indeed strengthened, since the
Chief Judge's opinion did not approve, did not even consider, the
administrative outcome that Judge Michel found to be so at odds
with the prior case law. The two decisions do state the post-Cabot
standard somewhat differently. The ChiefJudge summarized it as a
two part inquiry: (1) if, by its terms, a subsidy is provided to a par-
ticular enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,
it is automatically countervailable; (2) if, by its terms, a benefit ap-
pears to be nominally generally available to all industries, the bene-
fit may still be countervailable if, in its application, the program
results in a subsidy only provided to a specific enterprise or industry
or specific group of enterprises or industries.150 Judge Michel sum-
marized the Cabot line as holding that the inquiry must go beyond
general availability and must determine on a case-by-case basis the
effect of the benefit, and in particular, whether the subsidy dispro-
portionately benefits a foreign company or other industry as com-
pared to others, thereby creating a significant competitive advantage
145. See id. (recognizing that PPG brought "energy-intensive" argument on appeal for first
time in litigation).
146. Id. at 1579.
147. Id. at 1582 (MichelJ, dissenting).
148. ChiefJudge Nies declined to resolve whether "energy intensive" industries are "spe-
cific" industries because it is a legislative issue. Id. at 1579.
149. Id. at 1583 (Michel, J, dissenting).
150. Id. at 1576 (emphasis in original).
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over United States companies. 151 It is unlikely, however, that these
differences in formulation will matter greatly in future cases. In
Roses, Inc. v. United States,' 52 the first case on the countervailability of
subsidies decided by the CIT after the Federal Circuit's decision in
PPG, Judge Tsoucalas applied Judge Michel's statement of the stan-
dard, but noted that his outcome would have been the same had he
applied Chief Judge Nies' statement. 15
B. Class or Kind of Merchandise and Like Product Definitions
To determine whether imported goods are sold at less than fair
market value and whether a domestic industry has been materially
injured, Commerce defines a class or kind of foreign merchandise
and the Commission defines a like product and a domestic indus-
try.' 5 4 Commerce determines the imported merchandise that is the
subject of the investigation and determines whether those imports
are being sold or are likely to be sold at less than fair value.155 In
151. Id. at 1580 (Michel, J., dissenting).
152. 774 F. Supp. 1376 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
153. Roses, Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 n.3 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
154. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). This section provides as follows:
If_
(1) the administering authority [Commerce] determines that a class or kind of for-
eign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less
than its fair value, and
(2) the Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or
the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty ....
Id
155. Id. § 1677(16). This provision sets forth that for the purposes of determining the
imposition of antidumping duties "such or similar merchandise" means:
(A) The merchandise which is the subject of an investigation and other merchandise
which is identical in physical characteristics with, and was produced in the same
country by the same person as, that merchandise.
(B) Merchandise-
(i) produced in the same country and by the same person as the merchandise
which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) like that merchandise in component material or materials and in the purposes
for which used, and
(iii) approximately equal in commercial value to that merchandise.
(C) Merchandise-
(i) produced in the same country and by the same person and of the same general
class or kind as the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation,
(ii) like that merchandise in the purposes for which used, and
(iii) which the administering authority [Commerce] determines may reasonably be
compared with that merchandise.
Id.; see id. § 1673 (setting forth that administering authority [Commerce] determines whether
foreign merchandise is being, or will likely be sold in United States for less than fair value).
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contrast, the "Commission's role is to determine whether dumping
injures or threatens to injure an American industry."' 5 6 Because
the Tariff Act defines the domestic industry as the producers as a
whole of the "like product," in each investigation the Commission
must define the domestic product "like" the imported merchandise
under investigation.15 7 The statute defines "like product" as "a
product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in char-
acteristics and uses with, the article subject to an
investigation ... ,"158
In two separate cases captioned Torrington Co. v. United States, the
court reaffirmed the discretionary authority of Commerce and the
Commission to interpret antidumping duty statutes. 59 In the ad-
ministrative proceedings underlying the two Torrington cases, plain-
tiff petitioned for antidumping duties on imports of antifriction
bearings as a whole.' 60 Rather than determining whether foreign
companies were dumping antifriction bearings as a whole and injur-
ing a single domestic industry, however, Commerce determined that
the category antifriction bearings should be regarded as five classes
or kinds of merchandise.' 6' The Commission determined that those
classes or kinds of merchandise corresponded to six domestic like
products. 62 Torrington challenged the discretionary authority of
Commerce and the Commission, respectively, to deviate from the
classes or kinds of merchandise and the like product asserted by pe-
titioner in an antidumping investigation. 163 In the alternative, Tor-
rington questioned whether the determinations by Commerce and
the Commission were supported by substantial evidence.rl
In both decisions, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle
stipulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 16 5
that where an agency is charged with administering antidumping
156. Id. § 1673.
157. The Act further provides that " 'industry' means the domestic producers as a whole
of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production of that product .... Id. § 1677(4).
158. Id. § 1677(10).
159. 938 F.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 938 F.2d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
160. Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1276, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Torrington Commerce]; Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1278, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Torrington Commission].
161. See Torrington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1277 (naming five classes as: (1) ball bearings,
(2) spherical roller bearings, (3) cylindrical roller bearings, (4) needle roller bearings, and (5)
plain bearings).
162. See Torrington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1279 (naming six like products as: (1) ball bear-
ings, (2) spherical roller bearings, (3) cylindrical roller bearings, (4) needle roller bearings, (5)
plain bearings, and (6) slewing rings).
163. Torrington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1277; Torrington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280.
164. Torington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1277; Torringlon Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280.
165. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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and countervailing duty laws, the court "will not disturb its interpre-
tation unless it is unreasonable, and we conclude that it is not."' 66
The Federal Circuit adopted in both Tonington cases the thorough
analysis of the facts conducted by the CIT "as our own."'167
In Commerce's Torrington case, the plaintiff argued that once a pe-
tition satisfies the filing requirements, Commerce lacks the authority
to modify the class or kind descriptions provided in the petition. 168
The plaintiff relied on the statutory procedures for initiating an an-
tidumping investigation to support its argument. 169 The CIT deci-
sion adopted by the Federal Circuit noted, however, that no
provision prohibits Commerce from distinguishing between two
classes or kinds of merchandise when the petition does not properly
do so. 170 In reaching this conclusion, the court extended the appli-
cation of the Federal Circuit's earlier decision in Mitsubishi Electric
Corp. v. United States 171 which involved expanding the scope of the
investigation. 7 2 In Mitsubishi, the Federal Circuit held that the ad-
ministration, not the complainant, has the responsibility of deter-
mining the proper scope of the investigation and the antidumping
order.'7 3 The court in Torrington reiterated the standard stated in
Mitsubishi that" 'discretion must be exercised in light of all the facts
before the Administration and must reflect the agency's judgment
regarding the scope and form of an order that will best effectuate
the purpose of the antidumping laws and the violation found.' ,,174
In the Commerce Torrington decision, the court found this standard
satisfied if the agency supports its factual findings with substantial
166. Torrington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1278; Torrington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280; see
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(finding that courts should not substitute their own construction of statutes for that of reason-
able interpretation by agencies).
167. Torrington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1277-78; Torrington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280.
168. Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. 718, 719 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d
1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
169. See id. at 720 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(2) (1988)). Section 1673a(c) provides that:
"the administering authority shall ... (2) if the determination is affirmative, commence an
investigation to determine whether the class or kind of merchandise described in the petition
is being or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value .... 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a(c)(2) (1988).
170. Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. at 720.
171. 898 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
172. See Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. at 721 (discussing Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v.
United States, 898 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting scope of investigation into cellular
mobile telephone dumping included subassemblies so as to prevent circumvention of an-
tidumping order)).
173. Mitsubishi, 898 F.2d at 1582. The Torrington case involved narrowing the scope of the
investigation but the trial court found the principle to be the same. Torrington Commerce, 745 F.
Supp. at 721 n.3.
174. Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. at 721 (quoting Mitsubishi, 898 F.2d at 1583).
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evidence. 175
Torrington also challenged Commerce's departure from the defi-
nition of the class or kind in the petition as a departure from its past
practice, although recognizing that the agency had acted similarly in
two prior cases. 176 The court responded that even though Com-
merce does not exercise this authority often, the frequency of its use
does not limit its right to do so.' 7 7 Likewise, the court held that
simply because the criteria used by Commerce to determine the
class or kind referred to "general physical characteristics" and to
the "ultimate use of the merchandise," Commerce was not obliged
to adopt a broad interpretation of class or kind.' 78 Thus, in each
trade case in 1991 in which appellants in the Federal Circuit sought
to bind an agency to allegedly consistent past practice, the Federal
Circuit either wrote or adopted an opinion that allowed deviation
from the asserted practice. 179
In the Commission Torrington case, the plaintiff claimed that the
like product determination must conform to the like product defini-
tion provided by the petition.'80 The Federal Circuit adopted the
CIT's decision.' 8 ' In doing so, the Federal Circuit effectively en-
dorsed a line of CIT cases, much as it endorsed the Cabot line of
cases in PPG, that authorized the Commission to find that, corre-
sponding to the class or kind of imports, there might be several like
products or a single like product encompassing domestic products
not included in the scope of imports under investigation.' 8 2 The
175. Id. at 723.
176. Id at 722; see id at n.3 (citing Cyanuric Acid and Its Chlorinated Derivatives from
Japan, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,825 (Dep't Comm. 1984) and Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 3102 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final
determination)).
177. Id. at 722.
178. Id. at 723; see id at 728 (rejecting Torrington's argument and finding Commerce has
no such interpretation policy, and even if it did, it would not yield uniform results),
179. See, e.g., Toringlon Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1278 (deferring to discretion of Commerce
Department); Torington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280 (deferring to discretion of International
Trade Commission); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1187, 1187 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (adopting CIT decision which rejected contention that Customs Service lacked author-
ity to revoke previous practices).
180. Toringlon Commission, 747 F. Supp. 744, 748 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), af'd, 938 F.2d
1278 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
181. Torrington Commission, 938 F.2d at 1280.
182. See Torringlon Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 748 (citing cases recognizing that Commis-
sion may deviate from contentions made in petitions in determining whether one or more
industries have been injured by imports, and may deviate from International Trade Adminis-
tration's class or kind findings in making its like product determinations); see also Mitsubishi
Elec. Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 1025, 1057, 700 F. Supp. 538, 563 (1988)
(recognizing Commission's authority to assess injuries to domestic cellular mobile telephone
subassembly industry as part of investigation of petitioner's allegations that dumping injured
completed domestic cellular mobile telephone industry), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Kenda Rubber Indus. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 120, 123, 630 F. Supp.
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Federal Circuit, by adopting the CIT's decision, affirmed in Tor-
rington that, while the Commission does not have the authority to
modify Commerce's class or kind finding, it does have the right to
make an independent determination as to what should be consid-
ered a like product. 183 The CIT opinion adopted by the Federal
Circuit in Torrington followed an earlier CIT opinion affirmed by the
Federal Circuit in Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States.184 The CIT in
Algoma Steel observed that the possibility that the agencies will reach
inconsistent conclusions is "built into the law," and that the incon-
sistencies resulting from the plain language of the statute should be
tolerated unless they lead to results that Congress could not have
intended. 185
The appellant in the Commission Torrington case sought to bind
the Commission, as it had sought to bind Commerce, to a "broad"
interpretation of the like product.' 8 6 Torrington constructed its ar-
gument from the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, which instructs the Commission to avoid permitting "minor
differences in physical characteristics and uses to lead to the conclu-
sion that the product and article are not 'like' each other" and to
avoid defining the like product "in such a fashion as to prevent con-
354, 357 (1986) (upholding Commission's authority to determine that sale of imported bicy-
cle tires and tubes from Taiwan injured domestic bicycle tire and tube industries separately
despite not being distinguished in petition or in Commission's investigation); Badger-Powha-
tan v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 213, 217, 608 F. Supp. 653, 657 (1985) (observing that
it is within scope of Commission's investigative authority to determine that more than one like
product exists within single class or kind of merchandise as described by International Trade
Administration); Roquette Freres v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 88, 93, 583 F. Supp. 599,
603 (1984) (upholding Commission's determination that liquid sorbitol and crystalline sorbi-
tol are separate like products and industries despite being considered as one sorbitol product
and industry by petitioner).
183. Tordngton Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 748.
184. Id. (citing Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 518, 520, 688 F.
Supp. 639, 642 (1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989)).
185. Algoma Steel, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade at 520, 688 F. Supp. at 642.
186. See Torrington Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 748 (arguing that Commission does not
have authority to modify definition of like product in petition and that Commission applied
impermissibly narrow construction of like product). The arguments in Torrington Commission
are similar to the arguments brought to the court in PPG urging that the statute and adminis-
trative practice require a broad construction of "subsidy." See PPG Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (arguing administrator's actions conflicted with
language of statute and precedent). Indeed, the same counsel represented appellants in PPG
and in the Torrington cases. See Torsington Commerce, 938 F.2d at 1276 (listing Stewart & Stewart
as counsel for plaintiffs); PPG, 928 F.2d at 1569 (listing Stewart & Stewart as counsel for
plaintiffs). Whereas in PG a legally broad definition of subsidy would necessarily have
benefitted the domestic interest, a broad definition of the like product would not necessarily
have benefitted the domestic interests in Tonington. The Commission reached negative deter-
minations concerning three of the six like products it found. See Torsington Commission, 747 F.
Supp. at 747 (finding Commission rendered negative injury determinations for spherical
roller bearings, needle roller bearings, and plain bearings). There was no guarantee that, if
the Commission considered all six like products as a single product, it would not reach a
negative determination, thus giving the domestic interests no relief.
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sideration of an industry adversely affected by the imports under
consideration."'' 8 7 The court disagreed with Torrington's interpre-
tation of the statute's mandate and legislative history and found that
the Senate Report warns against permitting minor differences to
preclude a comparison of domestic products and imported prod-
ucts.188 The court noted that, on the present issue, the Commission
compared domestic products to other domestic products, not do-
mestic products to imported products.'l 9
In both Torrington cases, the court held that the true issue was
whether the factual findings of the agencies were supported by sub-
stantial evidence in view of the factors that they considered. 190 Each
agency had in prior cases adopted multi-factor criteria for making
their determinations.' 9 ' The court held that, notwithstanding some
similarities with respect to products concerning some of these fac-
tors, both Commerce and the Commission acted reasonably in find-
ing that the differences on which they relied outweighed the
similarities. 92 Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the court's
review for substantial evidence was its holding that, even though
there was little evidence to support the Commission's conclusion
that bearings move through different channels of distribution, the
Commission's ultimate like product determination would not be dis-
turbed. 93 The court found that it was not dispositive that one of
the six criteria did not support the determination. 194 It concluded
187. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
381, 476-77, quoted in Torrington Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 748-49.
188. See Torrington Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 749 (referring to Torrington's interpreta-
tion of "like product" based on S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979), reprinted
in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 476-77 and 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1988)).
189. Id.
190. See id. (finding it impossible for court to determine minor differences between vastly
different products investigated by Commission and that "[t]he issue of the Court is whether
the evidence used by the ITC to make its determination rises to the level of substantial evi-
dence and supports the conclusion"); Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. at 723 ("[Tlhe statutes
and case law require neither a 'broad' nor a 'narrow' interpretation of class or kind, only one
that is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law."); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1988) sets forth, in part, that "[t]he court shall hold unlawful any [Com-
merce and Commission] determination, finding, or conclusion found... to be unsupported
by substantial evidence .. "
191. See Asociacion Columbiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l
Trade 634, 639-46, 693 F. Supp. 1165, 1169-70 & n.8 (1988) (upholding Commission's line
product determination factors, which included (1) physical appearance; (2) interchangeability;
(3) channels of distribution; (4) customer perceptions; (5) common manufacturing facilities
and production employees; and where appropriate (6) price); Diversified Prods. Corp. v.
United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 155, 162, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (1983) (upholding Com-
merce's class of kind merchandise determination factors, which include (1) general physical
characteristics; (2) expectation of purchasers; (3) channels of trade; (4) ultimate use; and (5)
cost).
192. Torrington Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 753; Torrington Commerce, 745 F. Supp. at 727.
193. Torrington Commission, 747 F. Supp. at 751.
194. Id. The court noted that the six criteria are: (I) physical appearance; (2) inter-
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that "[i]f the balance of the evidence constitutes substantial evi-
dence, then the determination will be affirmed." 195
C. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Procedures
The Federal Circuit's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
United States 196 can be viewed as an intriguing case study in the intri-
cate relationship among courts, Congress, and administrative agen-
cies. Before 1988, the counsel for parties to antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations had little access to business pro-
prietary information in cases before the Commission, but could ob-
tain access to the confidential records in cases before the CIT. 197
The Commission also prohibited the granting of release of such
documents under administrative protective orders to any in-house
counsel. 198
In United States Steel Corp. v. United States,199 the Federal Circuit
held that the CIT acted improperly when it followed the Commis-
sion's lead and, solely on the ground that the counsel was an em-
ployee of the party, denied in-house counsel access during court
review to business proprietary portions of a Commission record
under judicial protective order.200 The Federal Circuit in United
States Steel held that a per se rule against such disclosure was inap-
propriate. 20 ' In dicta, the court articulated a standard for the CIT
to apply. It noted that in-house counsel might be denied access
where they "are involved in competitive decisionmaking." 20 2 The
court explained that competitive decisionmaking would involve "a
counsel's activities, association, and relationship with a client that
are such as to involve counsel's advice and participation in any or all
of the client's decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made in light
of similar or corresponding information about a competitor." 203
changeability; (3) channels of distribution; (4) customer perception; (5) common manufactur-
ing facilities and production employees; and where appropriate, (6) price. Id. at 749.
195. Id.
196. 929 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
197. See 19 C.F.R. § 207.7 (1987) (current version at 19 C.F.R. § 207.7 (1991)) (outlining
limited procedures for obtaining proprietary information from Commission); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677 f(c)(2) (1982) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(2) (1988)) (providing proce-
dures for obtaining confidential information by way of CIT order).
198. 19 C.F.R. § 207.7(b)(1) (1987) (current version at 19 C.F.R. § 207.7(a)(3) (1991)).
199. 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
200. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
201. See id. at 1468 ("Whether an unacceptable opportunity for inadvertent disclosure
exists, however, must be determined ... by the facts on a counsel-by-counsel basis, and can-
not be determined solely by giving controlling weight to the classification of counsel as in-
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In 1988, Congress amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)(A) to pro-
vide that, during their antidumping or countervailing duty investiga-
tions, Commerce and the Commission must make their business
proprietary information available under administrative protective
order to representatives of interested parties.20 4 In deciding
whether to grant access under administrative protective orders to
in-house counsel during administrative proceedings, the Confer-
ence Report on the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 instructed the
agencies to use the standard for the CIT's judicial protective orders
set forth by the Federal Circuit in United States Steel.20 5 Thus, the
Federal Circuit's decision in United States Steel, which changed CIT
procedures, influenced Congress to change administrative
procedures.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States was the first appeal
of agency action under this new provision. In Matsushita, an in-
house counsel holding the titles of general counsel, senior vice pres-
ident, and secretary for a respondent in a Commission investigation,
applied to the Secretary of the Commission for access to business
proprietary information under administrative protective order. 206
Counsel for petitioners in the investigation objected to disclosure
on the basis that the applicant was both an officer and general coun-
sel of the company. 20 7 In response, the applicant submitted an affi-
davit explaining the nature of his duties and of the meetings he
attended and asserting that he was not involved in competitive deci-
sionmaking.20 8 The Commission's Secretary granted the applicant
access to the information. 20 9 The CIT entered a temporary re-
straining order against release under the administrative protective
204. Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. I, § 1332(2)(A), 102 Stat. 1207 (1988) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)(A)). Congress amended the provision to state that "the Commis-
sion shall make all business proprietary information presented to, or obtained by it, during a
proceeding.., available to interested parties who are parties to the proceeding under a pro-
tective order described in subparagraph (B), regardless of when the information is submitted
during a proceeding." Id.
205. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 623, (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1548, 1656 ("In determining whether in-house counsel may properly be given
access, Commerce and the ITC should be guided by the factors enumerated in United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984)."). The Commission's regula-
tions implementing this instruction also referred to United States Steel in defining those in-
house counsel who might be authorized applicants for administrative protective orders. 19
C.F.R. § 207.7(a)(3)(ii) (1991).
206. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
207. Id.
208. See id. (describing applicant's asserted duties as officer and general counsel as review-
ing securities filings, reviewing employee benefit and stock purchase plans, keeping minutes
at Board of Directors' meetings, and attending retail store meetings).
209. Id. at 1104.
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order, and the Federal Circuit reversed.210
The Federal Circuit's reversal of the CIT's holding succinctly de-
fined the scope of the United States Steel doctrine as incorporated into
the statute and reaffirmed the limits of arbitrary and capricious re-
view. It would have been sufficient for the court to state, as it did,
that the applicant's submissions provided the Secretary with a rea-
sonable basis to conclude that he was adequately insulated from
competitive decisionmaking, particularly when the CIT found no
reason to doubt the veracity of the representations.2 1' The court,
however, also faulted the CIT for conducting a de novo review of
the record, holding that the CIT findings concerning the nature of
the meetings attended by the applicant were not only insufficiently
deferential but also contradictory. 212 On the legal issue, the Federal
Circuit held that the CIT's findings that the applicant's positions put
him in "regular contact" with policymaking elements of the corpo-
ration were irrelevant because the test is whether the applicant en-
gaged in giving advice and participating in competitive
decisionmaking.21 3 The Federal Circuit suggested that the CIT's
opinion effectively constituted the per se rule rejected in United
States Steel.214 The process begun in United States Steel had come full
circle.
IV. UNFAIR PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In each of the areas of trade law discussed above, the Federal Cir-
cuit reviews CIT decisions. In contrast, under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6), the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive,
direct jurisdiction over final determinations of the Commission with
respect to unfair practices in international trade.215 The court's re-
view of Commission determinations in 1991 primarily concerned
the agency's decisions on substantive issues of patent law that were
predicates for affirmative or negative findings of unfair practices.
Those patent law decisions are discussed in the accompanying arti-
210. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
211. Matsushita, 929 F.2d at 1580 (quoting CIT statement that it "has no reason to, and




215. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988) (providing direct appeal to Federal Circuit for deter-
minations by Commission involving exclusion of articles from entry, exclusion of articles from
entry during investigation except under bond, cease and desist orders, and conditions and
procedures applicable to exclusion from entry or cease and desist orders); 28 U.S.C.§ 1295(a)(6) (1988) (providing that jurisdiction of Federal Circuit includes direct appeals
from Commission determinations made under § 337 of Tariff Act of 1930).
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cle summarizing the court's 1991 patent decisions. 21 6
In some cases, however, the court's holdings affected the adminis-
tration of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 as a trade statute. The merits of the
Commission's finding of patent infringement was not at issue in Bi-
ocraft Laboratories, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission.217
In this case, the Commission determined that Biocraft (the in-
fringer) violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by importing an antibiotic cov-
ered by a patent of Bristol-Myers' (the patentee).2 18 The patentee
and the infringer subsequently entered into a settlement agree-
ment.2 19 Under the settlement agreement, the infringer paid the
patentee $21 million in full satisfaction of the patentee's claim.220
The patentee agreed to join a petition to the Commission for return
of bonds that the infringer had paid under a temporary exclusion
order issued during the pendency of the proceeding and which had
been forfeited when the Commission's determination of infringe-
ment became final.221 In the temporary exclusion order, the bond
provision stated that it did not apply to conduct that was otherwise
permitted. 222 Because the order permitted conduct that "is licensed
or authorized" by the patentee, the question was whether the settle-
ment licensed or authorized the prior sales otherwise covered by the
bond.223 The Federal Circuit held that the Commission abused its
discretion in refusing to release the bond and found that the settle-
ment operated retroactively to authorize the sales within the mean-
216. See generally Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit During 1991, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 869 (1992) (analyzing significant
patent law cases decided between January 1991 and December 1991).
217. 947 F.2d 483 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
218. Biocraft Labs., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 947 F.2d 483, 484 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
219. Id. at 485.
220. Id.
221. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) authorizes the Commission to exclude articles from enter-
ing the United States unless the importer posts a bond. This provision states:
If, during the course of an investigation under this section, the Commission deter-
mines that there is reason to believe that there is a violation of this section, it may
direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person with respect to whom
there is reason to believe that such person is violating this section, be excluded from
entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States,
and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded from
entry. The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under
this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice,
the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry, except that such
articles shall be entitled to entry under bond determined by the Commission and
prescribed by the Secretary.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (1988).
222. Biocrafi, 947 F.2d at 484-85.
223. See id. at 485 (quoting Paragraph IV of Commission's order).
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ing of the order.224 Furthermore, the court found that no other
public interest was involved that would justify the continued effec-
tiveness of the bond.2 25
In effect, the Federal Circuit in Biocraft encouraged settlements
prior to appeal at the cost of discouraging settlements during the
agency proceeding. 226 The order at issue provided for return of any
bond posted if the Commission either reached a negative determi-
nation or no determination at all.227 Thus, a reading of such orders
that did not provide for refund of monies in the event of a post-
determination settlement would give the respondent incentive to
settle before the Commission reached its determination. By holding
such a reading improper, the Federal Circuit lessened the motiva-
tion for settlement during Commission proceedings.
A similar view, both of the relative importance of burdens on the
agency and of the relevance of public interest factors in the Com-
mission's framing of remedies, appears to explain the court's proce-
dural disposition in Intel Corp. v. United States International Trade
Commission.228 In Intel, the Commission affirmatively determined
that the respondent's imports infringed two patents owned by In-
tel.229 The Commission issued an order excluding respondents' im-
ports that infringed Intel's patents from entry into the United
States.230 The court affirmed the finding of infringement as to one
patent and, without making any holding concerning infringement of
the other, vacated that portion of the Commission's order forbid-
ding importations that infringed only the second patent.
23
'
224. Id. at 486.
225. Id. at 486-87.
226. See id. (noting that returning of bond is consistent with intent of parties and encour-
ages settlement).
227. See id. at 485 & n.2 (reprinting Paragraph XI of order stating conditions for forfeiture
or release of bond).
228. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
229. Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,825 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The provision authorizing the issuance of exclusion orders is 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). This sec-
tion provides:
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section,
that there is violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, im-
ported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry
into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry. The
Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsec-
tion directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secre-
tary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1988).
230. Intel, 946 F.2d at 825.
231. Id. at 843-44.
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The disposition of Intel is the culmination of a five-year develop-
ment in the court's use of vacatur to limit its review of Commission
determinations. 23 2 The development began with Corning Glass Works
v. United States International Trade Commission,233 in which the court,
having affirmed the Commission's negative determination that the
petitioner's actions did not injure the domestic industry, vacated
those portions of the Commission's determination also reaching
negative conclusions on the substantive patent case.23 4 In Texas In-
struments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,23 5 the
Federal Circuit extended this practice to support the vacatur of por-
tions of orders issued after affirmative determinations. In that case,
the Commission's order barred the importation of specific compo-
nents produced by a foreign manufacturer that infringed three pat-
ents. 23 6 Finding two of the patents infringed, the Federal Circuit
vacated the portion of the order concerning the third because it was
coterminous with one of the others, noting that the patentee did not
claim that any of respondent's devices infringed the third patent and
not the others.23 7 The court in Intel applied this principle to vacate
portions of a limited exclusion order that was based on the infringe-
ment of a second patent.238 The court, however, noted the appar-
ent inconsistency between this approach and earlier dictum to the
effect that each ground for an exclusion should be regarded as a
separate order. 239
232. "Vacatur" is defined as, "[i]n practice, a rule or order by which a proceeding is va-
cated; a vacating." BLACK'S LAw DicxONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
233. 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
234. Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1571-72
(Fed. Cir. 1986). The court subsequently followed this precedent in Fischer & Porter Co. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (sustaining Commis-
sion's determinations of no injury yet vacating, without discussion, negative findings by Com-
mission on substantive patent issues).
In 1988, Congress added a new provision, making certain violations of rights in patents,
registered trademarks, copyrights and mask works violations of section 1337 without proof of
injury to a domestic industry. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, tit. I, § 1342(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1212 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D) (1988)). The injury requirement remains part of the petitioner's proof
for determinations of other unfair practices in international trade under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988) (requiring substantial injury to constitute unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair acts in importation of articles).
235. 871 F.2d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
236. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1057
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 1063-64. Likewise, the court in Texas Instruments vacated, without substantive
review, a noninfringement determination regarding a fourth patent that the patentee chal-
lenged. Id. at 1067. The court found the relief that the patentee received from the other
patent infringement determinations adequately covered all the goods and, therefore, made it
unnecessary to address the remaining patent issue. Id.
238. Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,844 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
239. See Texas Instruments, 871 F.2d at 1067 & n.7 (citing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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Like the Biocraft decision, the Intel and Texas Instruments disposi-
tions treated Commission orders simply as resolving issues between
parties in a case before it.240 Nevertheless, decisions by the court to
vacate portions of a Commission order can have significant impacts
on the administration of trade laws. The Commission's exclusion
orders constitute directions to Customs to stop goods that infringe
named patents from entering the United States.24 ' Upon the entry
of an exclusion order, it is not uncommon for foreign producers to
attempt to engineer around the patent named in the order.2 42 A
foreign producer might successfully engineer around the patent that
the Federal Circuit has retained in an exclusion order, but not
around a second patent that the court has eliminated from the or-
der. If the second patent remained in the order, the goods would be
excluded from entry, subject to an appeal of Customs' determina-
tion and a trial de novo in the CIT.243 If the second patent is elimi-
nated, the goods enter the United States. The patentee must again
petition the Commission for an investigation.2 44 That investigation
cannot provide remedies for already entered goods,245 and the
Commission's determination is subject to substantial evidence re-
240. The court was careful to note in Intel that, as in Texas Instruments, the "court was
considering a limited exclusion order, directed solely at the parties before it." Intel, 946 F.2d
at 844. In doing so, the court recognized that it has upheld the agency's discretion to enter
general exclusion orders directed to the world and not simply to the parties before it. See, e.g..
Allied Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989) (upholding Commission's modification to general exclusion or-
der prohibiting all foreign manufacturers from importing particularly produced amorphous
metal articles); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (arguing that Commission may modify order that is operative against goods
and that order is equally effective against those who participate in proceeding and those who
do not); Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985, 989
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (upholding exclusion order directed generally against multicellular plastic
material manufacturers).
241. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988) (authorizing Commission to issue exclusion orders);
supra note 229 (providing text of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)).
242. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control U.S.A., Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(acknowledging that foreign company, through United States subsidiary, designed around
patent); Rebecca S. Elsenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1017, 1028 n.44 (1989) (discussing benefits and problems of designing
around patents and providing sources supporting each position).
243. See Atmel Corp. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 679, 680-82, 719 F. Supp. 1101,
1104-05 (1989) (outlining jurisdictional requirements pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 1(a), (h), (i)
for CIT's de novo review of Custom's determinations).
244. Since the court vacated the prior determination, a new investigation would be neces-
sary. Although the Commission may commence an investigation on its own initiative, to en-
sure that the investigation takes place, the patentee must petition for an investigation. See 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988) (providing Commission's authority and duty to investigate alleged
violations of unfair practices in import trades).
245. The remedies afforded to the Commission under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 are prophylactic
in nature and do not include remedies for goods that have already entered. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(d)-(g) (1988) (providing exclusion of articles for entry, exclusion of articles from entry
under bond, and cease and desist orders as applicable remedies available to Commission
upon determining that import activity is unlawful).
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view in the Federal Circuit.246 During the pendency of the investi-
gation, goods are not excluded, but at most may be subject to the
bonding provisions described in the Biocraft decision.247 In short,
the Federal Circuit's decision to vacate portions of Commission or-
ders can affect what goods enter the country (and thus the effective-
ness of the Commission's orders as quasi-legislative actions
imposing embargoes), what agency decides infringement issues,
what court hears subsequent appeals in the first instance, including
whether a court trial takes place in those appeals, and whether the
Commission must conduct further investigations. The court did not
explain in either Intel or Texas Instruments why such consequences are
required if its decisions to vacate are discretionary, advisable, or
consistent with the statutory scheme. 248
In contrast to the outcomes in Biocraft and Intel, the decision in
Farrel Corp. v. United States International Trade Commission249 stressed
that the Commission does not simply act as an adjudicator of private
rights. 250 In Farrel, the parties entered into an arbitration agree-
ment that provided: "All disputes arising in connection with the
present Agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration. ' 25 1 On
Farrel's petition, the Commission instituted a section 337 proceed-
ing in the Commission just prior to a decision in a parallel district
court case involving the same challenged actions. The district court
dismissed the suit, holding that the arbitration agreement bound the
246. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988) (stating that reviewing court shall set aside agency
determination unsupported by substantial evidence); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that Federal Circuit reviews Com-
mission's findings of patent infringements under substantial evidence standard); SSIH Equip.
S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding that
case law and statutory law require all of Commission's factual findings to be reviewed under
substantial evidence standard).
247. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (1988) (providing that, if during course of investigation,
Commission has reason to believe there is violation ofstatute, Commission may exclude entry
of articles unless under bond); supra note 221 (setting forth text of section 1337(e)(1)); see also
Biocraft Labs., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 947 F.2d 483, 487 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(discussing mechanics and purpose of bond).
248. A review of the Federal Circuit's practice on vacatur is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. It may be noted that in one of the last patent cases of the year, Malta v. Schulmerich Caril-
lons, Inc., 952 F. 2d 1320 (Fed, Cir. 1991), the court, having upheld the district court's finding
of noninfringement, found it unnecessary to reach issues of equitable ownership and shop
rights raised in a cross-appeal, but did not vacate those findings. Id. at 1328.
249. 949 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. Mar. 16,
1992) (No. 91-1501). The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by intervenor-appellee in the
case and is opposed by the Commission.
250. Farrel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1152 (Fed, Cir.
1991) (observing that in reaching final determination on alleged violation, Commission must
consider factors that may or may not interest parties), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3689
(U.S. Mar. 16, 1992) (No. 91-1501).
251. Id. at 1149.
1992] 1991 AREA SUMMARY: INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1021
parties to bring it to arbitration. 252 Finding that the district court
decision collaterally estopped any question as to whether the scope
of the agreement reached the claims before it, the Commission ter-
minated its investigation before it made a finding on the merits of
Farrel's claim of trade secret misappropriation. The Commission
relied on the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, especially
in international disputes, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.253 The Commis-
sion also declined to exercise its discretion to self-initiate an
investigation. 25 4
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 19 U.S.C. § 1337 re-
quires the Commission to determine whether there is a violation
once it has begun an investigation. 255 The court found that the pol-
icy articulated in Mitsubishi was inapplicable, largely in view of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 2 56
In Gilmer, the Court held that subjecting a claim to binding arbitra-
252. See id. (citing Farrel Corp. v. Pomini, Inc., No. L88-2161A (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10,
1990)).
253. See id. at 1151 (discussing findings of Commission). In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a party
having made the bargain to arbitrate should be held to it unless Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. The Court further stated
that there is an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution" which "ap-
plies with special force in the field of international commerce." Id. at 631, quoted in Farrel, 949
F.2d at 1155.
254. Farrel, 949 F.2d at 1150 (noting that Commission instituted investigation based on
Farrel's complaint rather than self-initiating investigation as Farrel proposed).
255. See id. at 1152-53 (maintaining that statutory language of "Commission shall investi-
gate" and "shall determine" commands continuation of investigation). 19 U.S.C. § 1337 pro-
vides, in part, that "[t]he Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on
complaint under oath or upon its initiative." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988). The section
further provides:
The Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation conducted by it
under this section, whether or not there is a violation of this section, except that the
Commission may, by issuing a consent order or on the basis of a settlement agree-
ment, terminate any such investigation, in whole or in part, without making such a
determination.
Id. § 1337(c). The court regarded the mandatory language of this provision as requiring a
narrow reading of any exceptions to the need to make a conclusive determination on the
merits. Farrel, 949 F.2d at 1153. It also noted that other provisions of the statute, contem-
plating that Commission investigations would proceed parallel to proceedings in other fora,
suggested that in terminating an investigation in view of an arbitration, the Commission exer-
cised discretion that it could not exercise in the event of parallel district court litigation. See
id. at 19-20 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), (b)(1) (1988)). 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) provides that
violations "when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any
other provision of law .... 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1988). 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) provides
that for the purpose of tolling the statutory time limits applicable to the Commission, "there
shall be excluded any period of time during which such investigation is suspended because of
proceedings in a court or agency of the United States involving similar questions concerning
the subject matter of such investigation." Id. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
256. See Farrel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1156 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (discussing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)), petition
for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. Mar. 16, 1992) (No. 91-1501).
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tion under the Age Discrimination Employment Act only barred the
petitioner's access to a judicial, not an administrative, forum.25 7
The petitioner, according to the Court, was still free to pursue ad-
ministrative relief for age discrimination through the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).258 The Federal Circuit
held that this reasoning in Gilmer should also apply to the Commis-
sion because the Commission, like the EEOC, is available by statute
to a specific class of complainants, has independent authority to in-
vestigate alleged or apparent wrongs, and possesses a statutory
mandate to promote the public interest.259 The court concluded
that if the unique protections of the EEOC could not be privately
contracted away, then neither should the protections of the Com-
mission. 260 In determining whether issuance of an order is in the
public interest, the court indicated that the Commission could take
arbitration proceedings into account after its determination of
whether there was a violation of the statute.26'
257. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I11 S. Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991) (interpreting
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).
258. Id
259. Farrel, 949 F.2d at 1156.
260. Id
261 IW at 1154.
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